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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Decision-making processes are in the helm of organ-
isations, constituting an essential capability to pro-
mote companies’ mission and objectives. Although 
researchers exploring the fundamental causes of dis-
asters (Pigeon & O’Leary, 2000, Hopkins, 2005) in-
dicated that keeping the focus on top management is 
crucial, it seems to be reasonable to assume that a 
successful safety program will rely on the implemen-
tation capacity and on numerous local decisions 
from lower hierarchical levels. Many of these deci-
sions are not trivial and involve constant trade-offs 
between safety, productivity and quality require-
ments.  These trade-offs, particularly the conflict be-
tween safety goals and production, were summarised 
by Reason (2000), who pointed out an interesting 
paradox: although both safety and production are 
deemed to be equally indispensable, production is, in 
reality, the attribute that pays the bills.  Therefore, 
while responsible for guiding employees, directing 
everyday objectives and dealing with production ef-
ficiency and safety, first-line management is ex-
pected to deliver satisfactory (and sometimes daily) 
results to upper hierarchical levels, mainly concern-
ing companies’ pre-defined productivity goals. 
Major accidents, however, can deeply affect the 
continuity of operations and put an end to productiv-
ity goals, dramatically shifting the stakeholders’ at-
tention from periodic and consistent productivity in-
dicators (e.g. barrels per day, in an offshore produc-
tion platform) to the search for causes of the adverse 
event. Many of the findings arising from some well-
known recent investigation reports (e.g. National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling, 2011, Kurokawa, 2012) relate 
to poor managerial decisions in all hierarchical lev-
els, which triggered operational arrangements that 
resulted in undesirable outcomes.  
In February 2015, an explosion at the Floating, 
Production, Storage and Offloading Unit Cidade de 
São Mateus (FPSO CDSM) resulted in the most 
shocking accident occurring offshore Brazil in the 
last decade, and one of the top-three worst offshore 
disasters in Brazilian Offshore Oil & Gas history. 
Nine people passed away, and twenty-six workers 
sustained from minor to serious injuries after a hy-
drocarbon leakage and its consequent ignition at the 
FPSO’s pump room. The facility was producing 
non-associated gas and condensate by the time of the 
event. The investigation from the Oil & Gas regula-
tor (ANP, 2015) identified seven causal factors and 
twenty-eight root-causes, highlighting inadequate 
managerial decisions which exposed the facility to 
unmanaged risks. The investigation report from the 
Maritime Authority (DPC, 2015) mentioned that in-
consistencies from the safety management system 
gave room for improvised decisions, ultimately re-
sulting in non-conformities. Those supposedly 
flawed decisions involved middle and operational 
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management working in the field, where dealing 
with dynamic pressures related to the facilities’ re-
sult (e.g. time constraints to solve a failure, improper 
incentives) can be a substantial challenge. 
The conclusions arising from those investigations 
leave us with some important questions regarding 
decision-making processes and the practicability of 
adopting alternative approaches to ensure facilities 
are designed and operated in a safer way. To what 
extent were these decisions actually poor, in the face 
of organisational scenarios and operational challeng-
es encountered by decision-makers? Were these de-
cisions improvised and unreasoned, or did they fol-
low a well-defined and recognisable pattern, which 
could be considered natural and predictable if the 
outcome was different? How can we turn people in-
between top management and workers at the sharp-
end of operations into better decision-makers? 
The overriding purpose of the current work is to 
analyse decision-making processes by using the real-
life event that occurred in offshore Brazil waters to 
uncover the intricate conditions leading to question-
able (at least in hindsight) human decisions. The ul-
timate objective is to give some indications on how 
to tackle decision-making limitations by improving 
managerial rules and principles. 
2 ANALYSIS METHOD 
 
Moura el al. (2016) developed a major-accident da-
taset, which contains 238 disasters from different 
high-technology industrial sectors, including nuclear, 
aviation and oil & gas. The Multi-attribute Techno-
logical Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) was fed with 
information from detailed investigation processes 
conducted by independent investigation commis-
sions, regulators, insurance companies and experts, 
in order to disclose the circumstances surrounding 
the undesirable events and prevent their reoccur-
rence. Although each investigation team followed 
particular directives, procedures and terminology to 
scrutinise the major accidents, the dataset classifica-
tion method based on Hollnagel (1998) facilitates 
the application of a single framework, allowing the 
comparison of events from different industries and 
the search for common patterns. Previous work 
(Moura et al., 2017) successfully applied a clustering 
approach, i.e. Kohonen (2001) self-organising-maps, 
to identify major design shortcomings and develop a 
checklist focused on the improvement of design. The 
development of this design checklist was based on 
common features identified in Cluster 3, where acci-
dents containing design failures interfaced with hu-
man factors in most of the grouping cases. Figure 1 
presents the clusters’ arrangement after the applica-
tion of the self-organising maps algorithm. 
  
Figure 1. MATA-D Clustering Results using SOM, adapted 
from Moura et al. (2017) 
The SOM data mining results will be revisited, in an 
attempt to disclose new links associated with deci-
sion-making processes and support the understand-
ing of critical FPSO Cidade de São Mateus man-
agement decisions prior to the major event occurred 
in February 2015. Examples from the cluster of in-
terest will be given, in order to illustrate similarities.  
The reports on the FPSO CDSM accident (ANP, 
2015, DPC, 2015) provide very detailed information 
about the disaster, based on engineering analysis of 
the facility, examination of documents and investiga-
tive interviewing of company staff in different hier-
archical levels. 
Therefore, after presenting the intricate interac-
tions among different levels of an offshore produc-
tion oil & gas facility management, basic responsi-
bilities regarding safety will be assigned, in order to 
make the decision-making process exposed for fur-
ther analysis. Based on the aforementioned in-depth 
accident accounts, critical decisions which were 
identified as contributing factors or root-causes of 
the event will be highlighted. 
The deficiencies in the case study decision-making 
process will be then considered in the light of the 
tendencies disclosed by the application of the SOM 
algorithm, in order to enable the discussion of inher-
ent conditions which increase the likelihood of 
flawed judgments and mistaken choices in a high-
technology industrial facility. 
3 RESULTS 
3.1 MATA-D mining for decision-making 
shortcomings 
In the current work, the intention is to recognise 
common patterns associated with decision-making 
processes. In this regard, the statistical results from 
the SOM map indicated that Cluster 1 was dominat-
ed by the contributing factor named “Inadequate 
Task Allocation”, identified in 95% of the cases 
within this grouping (Cluster 1’s shadowed region in 
Figure 1).  
The overwhelming incidence of this factor highlights 
situations where managerial instructions were poor 
and lacked clear rules or principles, task planning 
was largely inadequate and/or work execution direc-
tives were poor. Table 1 presents the leading features 
for Cluster 1, which contains 80 major accidents. 
Contributing factors in italic attained slightly higher 
scores in other clusters, but were still significant for 
the grouping. 
 
Table 1: SOM Cluster 1 Main Statistical Results 
Human  
Factors 
Execution Error Wrong Place 52.50% 
Specific  
Cognitive 
Functions 
Observation Missed 
Faulty diagnosis 
Wrong reasoning 
20.00% 
26.30% 
20.00% 
Temporary  
person-related 
functions 
Distraction 11.30% 
Permanent  
person-related 
functions 
Cognitive bias 15.00% 
Technology Procedures Inadeq. procedure 78.70% Interface Incomplete info 36.20% 
Organisation 
Communication Communic. failure Missing information 
16.30% 
37.50% 
Organisation 
Maintenance failure 
Inadeq. quality ctrl. 
Design failure 
Inadeq. task alloc. 
Social pressure 
56.30% 
81.30% 
85.00% 
95.00% 
17.50% 
Training 
Insufficient skills 
Insufficient 
knowledge 
56.30% 
60.00% 
Working  
Conditions 
Irregular working 
hours 10.00% 
In Cluster 1, the map region occupied by the Inade-
quate Task Allocation factor was combined with de-
sign shortcomings, quality control problems, 
maintenance failures, training issues and communi-
cation difficulties, from an organisational perspec-
tive. The most relevant technological problem was 
having inadequate (incomplete or ambiguous) pro-
cedures. Inaccuracies in sequences of operational ac-
tions due to incorrect diagnosis of a situation or a 
faulty reasoning were also frequent. 
3.2 The Decision Structure at the FPSO CDSM 
The Offshore Installation Manager is typically the 
top authority on-board and the designated Offshore 
Incident Commander in case of an emergency. He is 
the key decision-maker and his personal judgment 
will direct the response efforts. Thus, his decisions 
will be now defined, considering the existing infor-
mation and the available choices. 
The standard organisation of a Production Oil & 
Gas Platform (Figure 2) is instantly transformed to 
respond an emergency, according to previous defini-
tion from the company’s Emergency Plan. Figure 3 
depicts the new roles for the operating staff. 
 
Figure 2 - Standard Organisational Chart, after ANP (2015) 
 
 
  
Figure 3 - Emergency Response Organisational Chart, after 
ANP (2015) 
Three groups were effectively involved in the Off-
shore Installation Manager decisions in the case 
study: (i) the Decision Board; (ii) the Emergency 
Response Team; and (iii) the Technical Advisory 
Response Team. The decision-making response 
structure for the FPSO CDSM is typical, having 
well-defined actors to pick a solution, to discuss op-
tions and recommend alternatives, to provide tech-
nical information about potential choices and their 
effects, and to confirm the capability and execute a 
sequence of tasks. Table 2 relates the FPSO CDSM 
personnel functions with standard roles of a classic 
decision or problem-solving structure. 
 
Table 2: FPSO CDSM Decision Structure, adapted 
from Herrmann (2015) 
FPSO CDSM  
Personnel 
Roles  
(Spetzler, 2007) 
Roles (Rogers & 
Blenko, 2006) 
- Offshore Installa-
tion Manager - Decision-maker - Decide 
- Marine Sup. 
- Production Sup. 
- Maintenance Sup. 
- Decision Staff - Recommend Al-ternatives 
- Technical Adviso-
ry Response Team 
- Emergency Re-
sponse Team (x2) 
- Content Experts 
- Implementers 
- Provide Input 
- Agree (confirm 
feasibility) 
- Perform 
The Decision Board was composed by the Offshore 
Installation Manager, the Marine Superintendent, the 
Production Superintendent and the Maintenance Su-
perintendent. There were two Emergency Response 
Teams aboard, composed of five members of the 
crew and having Safety Officers as leaders. The 
technical advisory response team had been created 
by initiative of the Offshore Installation Manager 
and was not on the formal Emergency Response Plan 
of the platform. Based on his experience in other 
platforms, he felt that it would be useful to have a 
technical advisory team to be consulted upon partic-
ular topics. It was made of relevant technical staff, 
e.g. the Pump Man. The informal group has partici-
pated in the three decision meetings, and its mem-
bers accompanied the on-site fire brigade to the 
Pump Room in all occasions. 
Although the investigation report (ANP, 2015) 
had suggested that the Onshore Emergency Central 
was contacted as soon as the gas alarms sounded, 
there was input from the land staff to the Decision 
Board until the emergency had escalated after the 
explosion.          
All decision meetings took place at the Central 
Control Room, and additional people (e.g. produc-
tion supervisor, control room operators, radio opera-
tor) were available to perform any action and modify 
the production system configuration. 
3.3 Response for a multiple-alarm event in the 
FPSO CDSM Pump Room 
Dealing with a multiple-alarm indication in the 
Pump Room was a non-routine event, and its possi-
ble causes and effects were neither certain nor obvi-
ous to the crew. Formal emergency response proce-
dures contained general instructions: (i) to deploy an 
equipped operator (with portable gas detector) to ex-
amine a single detection, or initiate general alarm for 
a multiple detection; (ii) use the Public Address Sys-
tem to announce an indication of a fire or gas re-
lease; (iii) Order a local evacuation in the single de-
tection case, or direct personnel to muster points 
under a multiple detection; (iv) confirm the designed 
automatic shutdowns (only for multiple detection); 
(v) Inform the Offshore Installation Manager.  
According to the ANP’s (2015) investigation re-
port, there were no further formal procedures, and 
the Offshore Incident Commander (the Offshore In-
stallation Manager in the case study) was responsible 
for assessing the situation and deciding what to do, 
after the initial steps above. For that reason, the 
Emergency Response Plan was considered incom-
plete by the investigators, and thus one of the root-
causes for the accident. 
The first response group assembly took place ap-
proximately four minutes after multiple alarms 
sounded. It was attended by The Decision Board and 
the Technical Advisory Response Team. The super-
visory control and data acquisition system had auto-
matically isolated the Pump Room by closing the 
ventilation dampers and entering the air circulation 
mode (DPC, 2015). Also, visual and audible alarms 
were activated in the whole facility and the person-
nel were directed to the muster points by the Public 
Address System. The Onshore Emergency Centre 
was also informed. As the leaked substance and its 
volume were unknown, the Incident Commander en-
sured the pumps stoppage (to eliminate possible ig-
nition sources and reduce the leakage) and deployed 
a response team (members from the official Emer-
gency Response Team and from the informal Tech-
nical Advisory Response Team) to the Pump Room, 
in the search for additional information. Gas detec-
tors were inhibited and alarms were silenced to facil-
itate radio communications. 
The first response team successfully executed 
their mission and brought new information. They 
identified the leakage point (i.e. liquid dripping from 
a flange) and encountered a two square meters pool. 
The second decision meeting took place approxi-
mately fifteen minutes after the initial assembly. On 
this occasion, the Emergency Response Team joined 
the Technical Advisory Response Team and the De-
cision Board to evaluate the current situation. The 
Incident Commander decided to partially restore the 
ventilation system, in order to avoid any electrical 
overheating and maintain production, and a second 
team was deployed to the Pump Room to define the 
corrective measures required. 
The second team accomplished their goal and 
communicated via radio the required tools for the 
repair implementation. The team left the Pump 
Room, allegedly to breathe fresh air, and the Emer-
gency Response Team leader and one member of the 
Technical Advisory Response Team went to the 
Central Control Room to join the third decision 
meeting.  
The third decision meeting occurred approximate-
ly fifteen minutes after the previous one. As a result, 
non-essential personnel were authorised to leave the 
muster points and have lunch. The necessary appa-
ratus (e.g. absorbent pads, tools, fire hose, and lad-
der) to repair the piping joint was prepared, and a 
cleaning and repair team, composed of five workers, 
was sent to the Pump Room.  
The cleaning and the repair activities were execut-
ed concurrently. During the cleaning, the absorbent 
pads were considered ineffective, and a water jet 
cleaning was initiated. After a request to increase the 
water jet pressure had been implemented, a major 
explosion occurred. Figure 4 represents the decision-
making flow.  
 
Figure 4 – Decision-making flowchart 
3.4 FPSO CDSM surrounding factors and their 
connection with MATA-D tendencies 
The application of the SOM algorithm grouped acci-
dents with similar characteristics. The data mining 
process indicated a particular cluster of interest con-
taining 80 accidents (Cluster 1), which has Inade-
quate Task Allocation issues as the prevailing con-
tributing factor. The patterns disclosed by the SOM 
grouping were deeply associated with the sequence 
of events witnessed in the FPSO CDSM prior to the 
disaster. The complexity of the operation of an off-
shore platform is extraordinary, and there are many 
contextual factors embedded in such organisation 
which might prove to be pivotal in case of an acci-
dent. Latent failures such as design shortcomings 
and operational weaknesses can deteriorate the sys-
tem to the point that people cannot compensate for a 
degraded operating environment. 
The FPSO CDSM investigation revealed many 
surrounding factors contributing to the events on the 
day of the accident. According to the report (ANP, 
2015) the marine team was largely undermanned. 
The lack of a safety critical function (senior marine 
operator or marine supervisor) and the regular accu-
mulation of management and operational roles (an 
operator was performing marine superintendent 
functions for a long period prior to the event) led to 
difficulties to control cargo transfer tasks and to un-
dertake judicious handovers between shifts. The 
handover between Offshore Installation Managers 
also failed to convey significant information regard-
ing the ongoing cargo transfer manoeuvre (DPC, 
2015). Human resources management problems and 
the lack of clear definition of responsibilities were 
contributing factors directly identified under the tag 
Inadequate Task Allocation in Cluster 1 (Table 2) of 
the Self-organising Map (Figure 1).  
There is an expectation that the organisation will 
provide enough personnel not only to operate the in-
dustrial facility under standard conditions, but also 
to deal with abnormal situations. However, the re-
current approach to operate with low manning levels 
results in serious vulnerabilities, particularly in case 
of atypical operational scenarios, a recognisable pat-
tern heightened in Cluster 1 accidents. Many exam-
ples are in line with the conclusions from the FPSO 
CDSM report. The investigation on the Varanus Is-
land accident (Bills & Agostini, 2009), for instance, 
highlighted low manning levels in various disci-
plines and having key competences outsourced or re-
stricted to specific members of the team as contrib-
uting factors to the disaster. Deficiencies in the shift 
handover and communication issues were also con-
sidered contributors for the Buncefield accident, ac-
cording to the COMAH report (2011). 
Another pattern identified in Cluster 1 suited the 
FPSO CDSM event surprisingly well, i.e. the link 
between inadequate procedures, flawed safety analy-
sis and inadequate task allocation. The investigation 
report indicated that emergency procedures were 
short on detail, lacking adequate hazard mitigation 
measures for a scenario of confirmed gas detection 
in the pump room. Moreover, operational procedures 
(e.g. cargo transfer) and plans (e.g. Process & In-
strumentation Drawings) directly related to the ma-
noeuvres which caused the gas leakage were obso-
lete and mismatched the existing process plant 
configuration. Many examples showing similar 
tendencies can be extracted from the cluster, such as 
the incomplete procedures for cargo transfer (i.e. 
tank filling) in the Buncefield accident, or the lack of 
emergency procedures for safe and proper response 
to a hazardous scenario (i.e. diesel engine over-
speed) in the Rosharon plant vapour cloud fire (US-
CSB, 2003).  
The normalisation of deviance was also a recur-
ring issue in the FPSO CDSM operation. Normalisa-
tion of deviance occurs when the group incorporates 
erratic operational conditions and accept risks as part 
of their work culture (Vaughan, 1996). In those cas-
es, individual risk perception and consideration of 
hazards are shaped by group thinking and, in a 
broader perspective, can be interpreted as a social 
pressure mechanism. It was known that the seat rings 
for the cargo transfer valves, which had a key sealing 
function, were inadequate for the type of condensate 
stored. The seals manufacturing material was sus-
ceptible to chemical attack, but maintenance and 
quality control measures failed to address the source 
of the problem, adopting alternative approaches to 
live with it instead. The storage of condensate itself 
played a significant role in the event. According to 
the investigation (ANP, 2015), the design conception 
and safety philosophy did not anticipate pure con-
densate storage, as the system was originally de-
signed for petroleum or a mix of petrole-
um/condensate. Operational studies and safety 
analyses had taken place, but these were superficial 
and failed to identify hazards and address increased 
risks due to the modified storage and cargo transfer 
process. Other deviations identified, such as the reg-
ular use of in-house manufactured blind flanges 
without ensuring compliance with the adequate pres-
sure class, were also discernible tendencies in Clus-
ter 1, where mismatches between equip-
ment/accessories and the required certification to 
operate under specific conditions were observed. 
Correspondingly, unsuitable bunds (were not im-
permeable) were evidenced during the Buncefield 
investigation (COMAH, 2011), and fixtures and fur-
ther fittings in the Rosharon plant (US-CSB, 2003) 
were not certified for the operational environment. 
Further significant design weaknesses, such as the 
lack of effective blast protection for the living quar-
ters and muster points, also coincided with Cluster 
1’s patterns. Accidents involving failures in the 
fire/blast protection and the consequent impairment 
of relevant equipment and locations were persistent 
within the grouping. The control room damages after 
a jet fire in the Castleford Petrochemical plant (HSE, 
1994) and the spreading fire to nonproduction areas 
in the Corbin facility (US-CSB, 2005) which killed 
eight workers, are examples, to name but a few, of 
analogous cases. 
3.5 Comparison between the FPSO CDSM 
decision-making and MATA-D task allocation 
shortcomings 
The environmental factors surrounding the decision-
making process in the FPSO CDSM showed deep 
correspondence with the tendencies disclosed by the 
SOM clustering method. Once the scenario is set and 
the surrounding factors are exposed, the decision-
making process immediately preceding the explosion 
can be disclosed under a well-defined context. The 
decision context is vital to comprehend the strategy, 
the objectives and the available choices to solve a 
problem, i.e. a gas release in the Pump Room.  
Snowden and Boone (2007) suggested a context 
classification scheme for decision-making, dividing 
it into 5 groups: simple, complicated, complex, cha-
otic and disorder. According to their approach, the 
existing decision context in the FPSO CDSM ranged 
between complicated (relationship between cause 
and effect is clear but not recognisable by everyone; 
may contain multiple right answers and thus require 
investigating several options; requires expertise) and 
complex (right answers cannot be ferreted out; un-
predictability; experiments which can safely fail lead 
to instructive patterns). 
The context faced in the FPSO CDSM is very 
similar to the patterns from the SOM Cluster 1. The 
application of the SOM algorithm revealed particular 
cognitive mechanisms underlying failures to perform 
a sequence of actions in analogous cases. The diag-
nosis of system state was incomplete, as the gas 
presence in the Pump Room was acknowledged, but 
not its possible effects (i.e. explosion). A faulty rea-
soning links to the decision-maker strategy, inferring 
that the solution applied before (enter the compart-
ment and execute repair services) would work well 
again. Some personal cognitive biases also exist, 
such as: (i) the belief that the situation was under 
control (reinforced by two successful excursions to 
the Pump Room); (ii) the incorrect review of proba-
bilities, after people returned from the Pump Room 
with portable detectors indicating that the atmos-
phere was significantly above the lower explosive 
limit; and (iii) the hypothesis fixation, as the deci-
sion-maker was focused on a single solution and 
thus constraining the sequence of actions to a partic-
ular approach which matched his assumptions. 
Additionally, the Offshore Installation Manager 
only boarded on the day of the accident, and was not 
aware of all ongoing operations, including the one 
which gave rise to the flammable gas cloud. After 
the alarm, the organisation adapted to a non-routine 
arrangement (From Figure 2 to Figure 3), and the re-
quired decisions were of uncommon nature. The lack 
of practical experience to define and perform tasks 
(lack of skills) and the unsatisfactory theoretical 
knowledge regarding the scenario and associated 
risks indicated that the FPSO CDSM manager lost 
the overall situation awareness.  
The decision-maker, with the support of experts, 
was confident in accomplishing the final goal (stop 
the leakage by detecting and repairing the escape 
point), but missed a crucial step: making the com-
partment safe and serviceable, despite all relevant 
signals (initial detection from fixed sensors, and later 
from portable detectors). The task planning was in-
consistent, the work procedure was poor and the 
managerial rule lacked clear principles such as re-
ducing the personnel exposure to risks. All these el-
ements are satisfactory captured under the Inade-
quate Task Allocation tag, which was the dominant 
element for Cluster 1, as many analogous examples 
show. 
4 DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the MATA-D clustering after the ap-
plication of the SOM algorithm revealed common 
patterns linking Inadequate Task Allocation, a key 
managerial problem, with several surrounding fac-
tors found in Cluster 1. Similar patterns and linkages 
among contributors were disclosed by the post-
accident examination of the explosion in the Pump 
Room of the FPSO CDSM, that occurred in Febru-
ary 2015.    
Many contributing factors arose from earlier deci-
sions, such as the modifications of the original de-
sign to adapt the operation to new conditions without 
a thoughtful consideration of risks. Therefore, the 
decisions with the intent to interrupt the leakage in 
the day of the accident were taken under a previously 
degraded decision-making environment, as produc-
tion objectives appear to have prevailed upon safety 
in some design, maintenance and quality control 
choices.  
During the event on the FPSO CDSM, the deci-
sion-maker was essentially left on his own, as clear 
instructions on how to proceed in case of gas con-
firmation in the Pump Room were missing from the 
emergency procedures. Therefore, he appeared to be 
in need of further information to decide what to do 
next. Accordingly, his first objective was to search 
for additional data, which he accomplished by gath-
ering information from operators in the Control 
Room and by sending a recognition team to the 
Pump Room. Before sending people there, he en-
sured that the pumps were disabled, valves from the 
cargo system were closed and the air exhaustion sys-
tem was shut. The leaked gas was certainly confined 
to the Pump Room. Moreover, he might have as-
sumed that the local system halt reduced the leakage 
and/or eliminated possible ignition sources inside the 
compartment.  
The first excursion to the compartment was very 
successful, and this repeated action – groups were 
sent to the gas-filled room three times – might have 
reinforced the (wrong) impression that it was safe to 
go there. Not only the decision-maker appeared to be 
confident that the developments of the system were 
under his control, but also the remaining participants 
of the decision-making process, including the emer-
gency team members. It is important to notice that 
the investigation reports (ANP, 2015, DPC, 2015) 
did not capture any signal of opposition to the strate-
gy of entering the compartment, not even from the 
most vulnerable ones – the people who were respon-
sible for performing the recovery tasks in an ex-
tremely dangerous site, and eventually died doing so. 
Signals of overconfidence are overwhelming. Af-
ter the second excursion to the compartment, the 
Offshore Installation Manager decided to release 
people from muster points and authorise them to 
have lunch, retaining only essential people to exe-
cute the required repair. The belief that the strategy 
was good – the leakage point had been identified and 
a repair plan was conceived – made the members 
constrain their alternatives to current assumptions, 
i.e. that the situation was reasonably controlled. This 
appears to be due to the absence of active ignition 
sources and the compelling fact that people do have 
entered the place twice, with positive results. 
The whole group – decision-maker, decision staff, 
experts and implementers – restricted their choices 
to a sole hypothetic solution. Under an unusual, 
complex scenario, the individuals immediately 
jumped to the only definitive solution available (re-
pairing the leakage), disposed to solve the problem 
as soon as possible and return to a safe operating sta-
tus. This recognisable hypothesis fixation might 
have made them skip two alternative solutions. The 
first one, to conduct operational manoeuvres to ven-
tilate the room, in order to eliminate the explosive 
atmosphere indicated by the local sensors and later 
confirmed by the crew. The second option would be 
a more conservative one: to abandon the ship. If the 
Offshore Installation Manager had recognised the 
imminent risk of explosion, he could have com-
manded an evacuation, aiming at the safety of the 
personnel. 
The uncertainties related with all possible scenari-
os, even in hindsight, turn the review of probabilities 
for the outcomes into a subjective problem. We can 
only be sure that the solution adopted had a negative 
consequence (thus was an error), but we cannot 
guarantee that the alternative solutions would pre-
sent a positive outcome. In the case study, trying to 
ventilate the flammable gas cloud from the com-
partment, for instance, is a very complex, high-
knowledge dependent procedure. For the first alter-
native solution, the design of the ventilation system, 
especially of the location of air outlets, should be 
understood to the point that people could make sure 
the discharge would not find an ignition point in a 
location even closer to the ship living quarters. Spe-
cial knowledge about the ducts dimension and flow 
speed would be required, to minimise the possibility 
of forming an explosive atmosphere in another 
place. It would be an exceptional operation, without 
any parallel with the routine of the crew and with no 
guarantee of success. Additionally, it would still re-
quire the repair of the leakage point afterwards.   
The second option, consisting of directing the 
crew to muster points, shut-down the plant and di-
recting the evacuation, is the most conservative one. 
Since the accident investigation indicated that the 
possible ignition sources were static electrical or 
mechanical sparks introduced by the repair proce-
dure, it would be sensible to assume that the ship 
abandonment would be successful. However, some 
individual and corporate negative effects would be 
certain. The decision-maker was the Incident Com-
mander, but above all he was the full-time Installa-
tion Manager, predominantly responsible to deliver a 
production result to his superiors. If he evacuated the 
unit and the explosion did not occur, he might have 
been considered excessively conservative, and jeop-
ardise his career as a manager. Furthermore, having 
a high-potential event stressed by the abandonment 
of the unit would put the company in the glare of the 
media spotlight, and under regulatory scrutiny.  
Therefore, the latter option involves a situation 
where the main objective of the company (continu-
ous production) would be unquestionably compro-
mised (with 100% certainty), against responding and 
tolerating some degree of risk (in fact, a subjective 
probability that safety will be compromised) to at-
tempt an immediate solution to the problem.  
This is the main reason why the decision-making 
process outcomes at the FPSO CDSM are not sur-
prising at all. On the contrary, it followed a very 
well-defined pattern, exposed by the region of the 
self-organising maps where the work organisation 
lacked clear framework guidelines and safety val-
ues/principles. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The decision-making process developed during the 
FPSO CDSM event resulted in an unsatisfactory but 
plausible outcome. Several relevant aspects leading 
to the disaster, which were embedded in the organi-
sation, were revealed by the two official investiga-
tion reports considered in this research. These fac-
tors were successfully related with common patterns 
belonging to one of the areas (i.e. Cluster 1) of the 
SOM map, indicating that known trends prevailed in 
the FPSO CDSM accident. It was made clear that the 
workgroup has inherited many organisational latent 
failures, including unsound design choices, which 
might have consciously or unconsciously encouraged 
an atmosphere of decisions favouring production 
over safety. Considering the environment and the na-
ture of the position of the decision-maker, it should 
be anticipated that a predilection for a quick solu-
tion, which would pose less impact to his (and the 
company’s) perceived key objectives, would over-
power any presumably safer but certainly riskier 
choice to the production upkeep.  
The decision-maker has not entirely overlooked 
safety principles. He took rational preventive actions 
before sending the team to the Pump Room (e.g. 
confirmed shutdown of possible ignition sources and 
the closure of ventilation dampers to avoid escala-
tion), monitored the risk (through the information he 
received) and updated his decision-making process 
in an optimistic way: he believed (and most likely 
received ratifying indications from local teams) that 
the repair was possible and reasonably safe. Of 
course, some measures taken were questionable, 
such as having members of the Technical Advisory 
Response Team entering the Pump Room along with 
the Emergency Response Team. This exposed a 
larger than necessary group to the explosion and 
challenged any cautionary principle. It is not very 
surprising though, as it might be the case that he di-
agnosed the likelihood of an explosion as extremely 
low, during his quick mental review of probabilities, 
and understood that the risk was worth taking. 
It is not possible to assume that another Offshore 
Installation Manager, with the same level of skills 
and knowledge and under the same scenario, would 
adopt a different solution. Hence, considering the in-
trinsic and immediate goals of the work position, the 
specific training and information required to solve 
complex, non-routine problems, the normal variabil-
ity in human behaviour and the organisational pat-
tern in line with many major accidents from MATA-
D, it is supposed that improved organisational con-
figurations would be necessary to reduce major acci-
dents. 
For example, in the case of production platforms, 
a conceivable solution to improve emergency on-
board decisions would be to dedicate one or two 
people to damage control. These people would take 
responsibility for leading emergency operations, 
immediately exchanging information with the land 
Emergency Control Centre and gathering data from 
on-board operational personnel. The key objective of 
the damage control personnel would be safety, sub-
stantially reducing any conflicting goals, especially 
with production maintenance. Skills and knowledge 
of these professionals would be planned to improve 
the understanding and operation of important sys-
tems during an emergency. In the case study, gas de-
tectors and alarms were disabled to improve radio 
communications. It is obvious that the human-
machine interface were not ideal. Therefore, it ap-
pears that a dedicated console (e.g. a Damage Con-
trol Console) would be desirable, in order to provide 
adequate information for the recovery of emergency 
scenarios and assist the decision-making process.  
Certainly, these changes in the sharp-end of the 
process would need to be accompanied by high-level 
measures involving, for instance, the design. In the 
case study, many latent failures imbedded in the 
concept of the plant (e.g. lack of blast protection for 
the living quarters; decision to convert a Very Large 
Crude Carriers into a Production Platform, inheriting 
the arguable location of the accommodation module 
above the Pump Room) appear to have contributed 
to the event. Those earlier decision-making process-
es could also be thoughtfully investigated and dis-
cussed, in order to identify further improvement op-
portunities. 
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